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THE DEAD MAN'S RULE AS APPLIED TO TORT ACTIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
There is always danger of injustice when a vital witness is unavailable.
This is especially true when a party to a transaction dies and his testimony is
lost, for there is danger that injustice may be done by reason of false claims
against his estate. To counteract this danger, most states, including Pennsyl-
vania, have what is commonly known as a "Dead Man's Rule." Generally,
this is designed to prevent a surviving party or witness to the transaction, who
has a direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the result of the suit, from
testifying as to anything that occurred before the death of the deceased party.
Hence, the object of this rule is to place the parties on an equal footing, and
to prevent one of them, to the detriment of the other, from taking unfair
advantage of the fact that the lips of the deceased have been sealed by death.
However, these rules have been condemned by many of the modern writers on
the law of evidence as creating as much injustice as they prevent.' It is appar-
ent that while such a rule may prevent a dishonest person from testifying
falsely, it equally bars the testimony of honest litigants, and hence does harm.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence propose abolition of the Dead Man's Rule
entirely,' but admit as a counterweight to the survivor's testimony and as an
exception to the hearsay rule, statements made by the deceased concerning the
transaction.' This is the rule now adopted in Connecticut,' Massachusetts,'
Rhode Island,' and South Dakota,7 and in those states it appears to have been
successful.' Such a major reform ' has yet to be accepted by our legislature,
although the Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar on Judicial Administration
1 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 578, 696 (3rd. ed. 1940). Wigmore attacks it with characteristic
vigor: "As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-qualification is
deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as
much or more false decision than it prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass
of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words."
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, 142, 143 (1954). "Slowly, the law-makers are being
brought to see the blindness of the traditional survivor's evidence Acts, and liberalizing changes
are being adopted."
2 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 7. "Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, (a)
every person is qualified to be a witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be a wit-
ness, and (c) no person is disqualified to testify to any matter, and (d) no person has a privilege
to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any object or writing, and (e) no person has a privi-
lege that another shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall not produce any ob-
ject or writing, and (f) all relevant evidence is admissable."
3 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 63, (4), (c).
4 CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 7895 (1949)
5 MAss. ANN. LAWS c.233 § 65 (Supp. 1954)
6R.I. GEN. LAws c.538 § 4, 5, 6 (1938)
7S.D. CODE § 36.0104 (1939)
8 Ladd, Symposium on Uniform Rules, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 523, 566 (1956).
9Ibid.
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voted overwhelmingly in favor of the new rules."° Despite the repeated attacks
upon its soundness, the Dead Man's Rule is still the law in our Commonwealth,
and continues to present intricate problems of interpretation.
Since there seems to be more vehemence against retention of this incom-
petency rule in tort actions "' than in contract actions, it shall be the purpose of
this comment to review the application of the Dead han's Rule to tort actions
in Pennsylvania, and to discuss the extent to which a surviving party or witness
is disqualified from testifying when he falls within the letter of the rule.
At common law in Pennsylvania, parties were incompetent to testify in
their own suits and witnesses were incompetent whenever it appeared that they
had an interest in the subject matter in controversy." Interest was the dis-
qualifying feature. The Act of 1869 "s abrogated this common law disquali-
fication for interest. Hence, it was enacted to make witnesses competent to
testify, not incompetent. These provisions of the Act of 1869 were incorpo-
rated in the Act of 1887," to which the Dead Man's Rule is only one of four
exceptions. 15 This exception, interpreted literally, prohibits a surviving party
to a thing 16 or contract in action from testifying as to "any matter occurring
before the death" of a deceased party.17  As indicated supra, it was reasoned
10 Braham, The Uniform Rules of Evidence, reprinted from the LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (April
27, 1955). Judge Braham states: ". . . The Uniform Rules of'Evidence promulgated August 17,
1953 are the result. The Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar on Judicial Administration voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the new rules . . . The bench and bar have been increasingly aware
of the defects in the dead man's rule. The difficulty is that in protecting one set of parties we have
exposed others to unjust loss. In order to protect estates from impecunious and unscrupulous claim-
ants, we have sometimes shut the mouth of the most deserving and meritorious claimants .... "
11 Id. at 5. ". . . In tort cases the effect is most obvious. The death of the most reckless,
wanton and obnoxious character involved in a wreck of automobiles may result in defeating the just
claims of a number of innocent persons whose lives he has ruined by his negligence but against
whom they are unable to -testify."
12 Miller v. Frazier, 3 Watts 456 (Pa. 1835); Norris v. Johnson, 5 Pa. 287 (1847); see 5
U. PTT. L. REV. 125 (1939); Hendrickson's Estate, 388 Pa. 39, 44, 130 A.2d 143 (1957).
13 Act of April 15, 1869, P.L. 30.
14Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, 28 P.S. § 314 (1930). Section 4 states: "In any civil pro-
ceeding before any tribunal of this Commonwealth, or conducted by virtue of its order or direction,
no liability for costs nor the right to compensation possessed by an executor, administrator or other
trustee, nor any interest merely in the question on trial, nor any other interest, or policy of law,
except as is provided in section five of this act, shall make any person incompetent as a witness."
15 Ibid., 28 P.S. §§ 315-322 (1930). To this rule, as set forth in note 14 supra, section 5 of
the statute makes four exceptions: The first concerns convicted perjurers; the second, confidential
communications; the third, testimony of husband and wife adverse to one another; and the fourth,
the dead man's rule.
16 Vol. 41, WORDS AND PHRASES, PERM. ED., "Thing". The word "thing" means that which
is or may become the object of thought; that which has existence or is concerned or imagined as
having existence, any object, substance, attribute, idea, fact, circumstance, event, etc. A thing may
be material or ideal, animate or inanimate, actual, possible or imaginary. The word "thing in action"
has been held to mean a "cause of action" where the relief sought is the recovery of money or other
personal property.
17 Act of May 23, 1887 P.L. 158 § 5 cl. e, 28 P.S. 322 (1930). "Nor where any party to a thing
or contract in action is dead, or has been adjudged a lunatic and his right thereto or therein has
passed, either by his own act or by the act of the law, to a party on the record who represents his
interest in the subject in controversy, shall any surviving or remaining party to such thing or con-
tract, or any other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased or lunatic
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that death having sealed the lips of one party, even-handed justice required
that the survivor's lips also be sealed. 8 It should be noted at this point that
this is considered by the writer to be too literal an interpretation of the rule,
especially with regard to tort actions. This should not mean that the surviving
party or witness cannot take the witness stand, but only that he is disqualified
with regard to certain ntters, as will be more fully explained below. Under
the Dead Man's Rule three conditions must exist before the surviving party or
witness is disqualified: "9 (1) the deceased must have had an actual right or
interest in the matter at issue, i.e. an interest in the immediate result of the
suit; (2) the interest of the witness-not simply his testimony-must be ad-
verse, i.e. he must stand to gain or lose as the direct legal operation of the
judgment; (3) a right of the deceased must have passed to a party on the
record who represents the deceased's interest. For the purposes of this com-
ment, it is assumed that these conditions exist, and that the witness or surviv-
ing party is disqualified, so far as the rule is meant to apply.
The parent case in Pennsylvania holding that in tort actions death seals
the lips of the surviving party or witness is Irwin v. Nolde,20 decided in 1894,
in which the court held that the Act of 1887 applied to actions in tort as well
as to contract actions. In that case the plaintiff brought an action of trespass
q.c.f. against the defendants for taking forcible possession of his fields. Both
defendants died before the trial was held, yet the lower court permitted the
plaintiff to testify as to matters occurring before the death of the defendants,
holding that the Act of 1887 applied only to contract actions. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Fell, reversed the decision
of the lower court, holding that the plaintiff was excluded by Section 5, Clause
E of the Act of 1887, (the Dead Man's Rule). The opinion stated that the
Act made no distinction between different classes of civil actions.
"Nolde was party to the thing or contract in action, a right connected
with the property, and the plaintiff was a surviving party as well as a person
party, be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of said party or the adjudi-
cation of his lunacy, unless the proceeding is by or against the surviving or remaining partners, joint
promisors or joint promisees, of such deceased or lunatic party, and the matter occurred between such
surviving or remaining partners, joint promisors or joint promisees and the other party on record, or
between such surviving or remaining partners, promisors or promisees and the person having aninterest adverse to them, in which case any person may testify to such matters; or unless the action
be ejectment against several defendants, and one or more of said defendants disclaims of record any
title to the premises in controversy at the time the suit was brought and also pays into court the
costs accrued at the time of his disclaimer, or gives security therefor as the court in its discretion
may direct, in which case such disclaiming defendant shall be a fully competent witness; or, unless
the issue or inquiry be devisavit vel non, or be any other issue or inquiry respecting the property of
a deceased owner, and the controversy be between parties respectively claiming such property by
devolution on the death of such owner, in which case all persons shall be fully competent witnesses.-
18 Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 304, 305 (1870).
19 See note 17 supra. See also 5 U. PITT. L. Rsv. 125, 132 (1939); Hendrickson's Estate, 388
Pa. 39, 45, 130 A.2d 143 (1957).
20 164 Pa. 205, 30 Atl. 246 (1894).
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whose interest was adverse to the right of the deceased party. He was within
the letter and spirit of the excluding clause of the act and clearly incompetent
to testify." (Italics added).
Since that decision, our courts have uniformly followed the rule of this
case as the law in Pennsylvania."' It should be noted that the question as to
whether a surviving party or witness, who falls within the rule, is completely
disqualified from testifying, has not been directly discussed in these cases. But,
the decisions found tend toward a strict interpretation of the Act and appear
to prohibit the surviving party or witness from testifying as to any matter
occurring before the death of the opposite party.22 This also seems to be the
interpretation of the rule in the few automobile collision cases dealing with
it.2" One of the first applications of the Dead Man's Rule to actions involving
automobile accidents was in the 1935 Superior Court case of Neibauer v.
Shultz.2"' In that case the plaintiff Niebauer was a passenger in an automobile
involved in a collision with another automobile operated by the defendant
Shultz. Shultz died before the trial was held and the lower court decided,
inter alia, that as Shultz was dead at the time of bringing suit, the plaintiff
was not a competent witness to testify against his administrator as to anything
that occurred during the lifetime of Shultz. This decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court without comment." Furthermore, the far-reaching conse-
quences of the Nolde decision are very evident in more recent years. In the
1946 Circuit Court of Appeals case of Wright v. Wilson,2" the federal court
was presented with this same problem. In an opinion by Judge Goodrich, the
court held that:
"The Pennsylvania statute is explicit in prohibiting the testimony of the
survivor .... The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has sharply indicated that the
plain language of the statute is not to be circumvented. So far as Pennsylvania
Law is concerned, it is clear that the door is tightly closed against admissability
of the proffered testimony ... the only conclusion we can reach is to say that
the testimony offered by the survivor of an accident in this case is not admissable
against his opponent. We reach the result without enthusiasm. The rule ex-
cluding a survivor's testimony seems to stand in the almost unique situation of
being condemned by all the modern writers on the law of evidence. It is said
to be as unsound as the rule excluding the testimony of parties, of which the
21 Kreps v. Carlisle, 157 Pa. 358, 27 At. 741 (1893); Lockard v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591, 79 At.
802 (1911); Keating v. Nolan, 51 Pa. Super. 320, (1912); McCaulif v. Griffith, 110 Pa. Super.
522, 168 At!. 536 (1933); Niebauer v. Shultz, 114 Pa. Super. 538, 174 At. 812 (1933); O'Brien
v. Gray, 121 Pa. Super. 27, 182 At. 746 (1936); Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1946);
Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957).
22 Ibid.
2 3 Niebauer v. Shultz, 114 Pa. Super. 538, 174 At. 812 (1935); O'Brien v. Gray, 121 Pa.
Super. 27, 182 At. 746 (1936); Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1946).
24 114 Pa. Super. 538, 174 Atl. 812 (1935).
25 318 Pa. 266, 178 At!. 285 (1935).
26 154 F.2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1946).
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survivor rule is a part. But we believe this to be a case where a rule so thor-
oughly established through many generations of judicial history should be re-
moved by legislative action or court rule which applies generally and not by
judicial legislation in a particular case."
The question to be considered is whether the plain language of the statute
need be circumvented in all cases. Should a surviving party or witness to an
automobile accident, who falls within the letter of the Dead Man's Rule, be
incompetent to testify to "anything that happened during the lifetime of the
deceased," i.e. unable to testify at all? This could not have been the intention
of the legislature in allowing the Dead Man's Rule to remain as an exception
to the Act of 1887 which abrogated the common law disqualification for inter-
est! The decisions set forth above do not decide, and should not be construed
to mean, that the surviving party or witness is disqualified from taking the
witness stand. The disqualification should extend only to those matters sur-
rounding the immediate happening of the accident. The rule should apply
only in relation to the "thing" concerned, i.e. the res gestae of the accident
itself. More particularly, the surviving party or witness should be disqualified
from testifying only with regard to matters which the deceased party could
have contradicted had he lived.
The Dead Man's Rule need only be interpreted in light of the basic reason
for it's existence in order to justify this result. A careful analysis of the statute
reveals that this must be the correct interpretation. Interest is not the true
reason for preventing a surviving party or witness from testifying to a thing
or contract with the deceased in an action by or against his estate. The basic
reason is that such testimony is not subject to the principal safeguard for
truth-contradiction. As stated at the beginning of this comment, the object
of this rule is to place the parties on an equal footing and to prevent one of
them, to the detriment of the other, from taking unfair advantage of the fact
that the lips of the deceased have been sealed by death. Contradiction is the
key word.
This is clearly the interpretation of similar rules in several other juris-
dictions." The most recent case concerning this point is that of Sears, Roe-
27Yuritch v. Yuritch, 139 N.J.E. 439, 51 A.2d 901 (1947). "The test laid down for ascer-
taining what is a transaction with the deceased within the intendment of the statute, is to inquire
whether, in case the witness testified falsely, the deceased, if living, could contradict it of his own
knowledge."
McCary v. McMorris, - Ala. , 92 So. 2d 319 (1957). "The provisions of the
statute exclude a witness from testifying to any transaction between himself and the dead, in all
cases . . . where the presumption exists that the dead, if living, could explain, qualify, or con-
tradict."
Harris v. Berry, - S.C. , 98 S.E. 2d 251 (1957). "It is founded on the principle
that it is against public policy to allow a witness thus interested to testify to such matters when such
testimony, if true, cannot be contradicted."
Andreades v. McMillan, - Tex. -, 256 S.W. 2d 477 (1953); Sears, Roebuck and
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buck and Co. v. Jones 2 in the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, May 9, 1957.
That case involved a collision between two trucks-one owned and operated
by the plaintiff Jones, the other owned by the defendant Sears, Roebuck and
Co., and driven by their employee, defendant Truitt. Before the trial, defend-
ant Truitt died, yet the trial court permitted the plaintiff to testify against his
estate fully and in detail as to the circumstances surrounding the collision, over
the repeated objections of the defendant that such testimony was in direct
violation of the Texas Dead Man's Statute."8 An oral deposition by the defend-
ant Truitt had been taken prior to his death in which he testified that he was
intoxicated at the time and could not remember a thing concerning the accident.
On appeal, the Civil Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of plaintiff's
testimony, holding that the Dead Man's Statute was not applicable:
"The proper test in determining whether testimony violates the provi-
sions of this article of the statutes is whether or not, if the witness testified
falsely, the deceased, if living, could have contradicted such false testimony of
his own knowledge." 30
It was clear from the evidence in this case that had Truitt lived to testify, he
would not have been able to contradict the testimony of the plaintiff as to any
of the circumstances surrounding the collision, for by his own admission, he
was intoxicated and could not recall what had happened.
It is important to note at this point that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has used this analysis of our Dead Man's Rule in Mozino v. Canuso,"1 a 1956
partnership case. The plaintiff there sued in assumpsit to recover damages
upon an alleged breach of oral contract against the defendant partnership
which consisted of a father and son. After the issue had been joined, the de-
fendant father died. The plaintiff, with leave of court, subsequently amended
his complaint so as to show the action as being against the surviving partner
alone. Over the objections of the defendant based on the Dead Man's Rule,
the trial judge permitted the plaintiff to testify generally with regard to the
oral contract, being of the opinion that the plaintiff's amended complaint made
the rule inapplicable. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
Co. v. Jones, - Tex. , 303 S.W. 2d 432 (1957). "The proper test in determining
whether testimony violates the provisions of this article of the statutes is whether or not, if the witness
testified falsely, the deceased, if living, could have contradicted such false testimony of his own
knowledge."
28303 S.W. 2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
29 VERNON'S ANN. CIv. ST., art. 3716: "In actions by or against executors, administrators, or
guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator, inte-
state or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and the provisions of this
article shall extend to and include all actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a
decedent arising out of any transaction with such decedent."
50 Italics added.
3' 384 Pa. 220, 120 A.2d 300 (1956).
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defendant filed motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. The court en banc
denied the motion for judgment n.o.v., but awarded a new trial, basing the
grant on the ground that the Dead Man's Rule had been violated. For reasons
other than the evidence question the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a
new trial but determined to pronounce upon the question of the plaintiff's
competency to testify under the Act of 1887. Being of the opinion that it
was improperly decided below, the court stated inter alia:
"Section 5 (e) of the Evidence Act of 1887 does not warrant an inter-
pretation that would quarantine the surviving partners against the claims of
creditors of the partnership simply because one of the partners has died. There
must be more than that. The thing or contract in action must be such that the
deceased partner, if living, would have been a material and relevant witness
concerning matters relating thereto." 32
In most cases the statute thus interpreted would still eliminate testimony
as to the circumstances immediately relevant to the manner in which the acci-
dent occurred, except where it is clear that the deceased could not have contra-
dicted anything that happened even if he had lived, in which case, the surviving
party or witness would be competent to testify as to everything that happened,
as in the Sears, Roebuck case supra. But certainly the deceased party could not
contradict facts concerning which only the surviving party or witness could have
any knowledge. Hence, he should be competent to testify to all matters not
related to the immediate happening of the accident, particularly with reference
to the manner in which he was driving his car prior to the accident, where he
was traveling to, where he was coming from, and the speed at which he was
traveling before the instant when the conditions arose which brought about the
accident. He should also be competent to testify as to the position of his car
after the accident, the damage to his property, the injuries he received, loss of
wages and earnings, hospital and doctor bills, pain and suffering, and other
relevant matters of similar importance. Neither the Act of 1887 nor the deci-
sion in Irwin v. Nolde should be construed to prevent a surviving party or wit-
ness from testifying to "anything that happened during the lifetime of the
deceased."
It is apparent that the Dead Man's Rule stands in a very unique position.
There appears to be an almost universal distaste for the rule among the mod-
ern writers on the law of evidence. It is condemned as illogical and a breeder
of injustice, because in seeking to avoid injustice to the estates of a deceased
party, the rule is blind to the equal possibility of injustice to the living. Yet,
in the face of logical and persuasive attacks upon its soundness, the majority




conservative attitude is based upon a failure of the reformers to offer a suitable
solution. But the important thing to notice is that injustice is recognized as
an inherent defect of the Dead Man's Rule. Therefore, it should be narrowly
construed in all instances. There must be no possibility of doubt as to the
extent of disqualification in any case. But, as indicated in this comment, there
is clearly a possibility that the statute could be construed to prevent a surviving
party or witness from testifying at all in a suit by or against the decedent's
estate. Such a result would be intolerable. Hence, it is recommended that the
test of contradiction, as set forth in the Sears, Roebuck case supra, be incorpo-
rated in the Dead Man's Rule by legislative action or court rule to avoid any
possibility of doubt as to the correct interpretation.
GORDON E. STROUP
